Myanmar President seeks improvement in global perception

The victory of Min Aung Hlaing’s party, the USDP (Union Solidarity and Development Party), after winning 80% of the remaining seats in the recent elections, means that he is officially Myanmar’s president. However, with the USDP being the military's proxy and Hlaing its former general, the legitimacy of these elections is under heavy scrutiny both domestically and on the international stage. Most importantly, perhaps, are the dangerous implications of the elections 'legitimising' the autocrat, perhaps subsequently leading to a shift in his global perception.

Take the Myanmar people, for example: after the successful coup d’etat staged by Hlaing in February 2021, protests broke out across the country. The USDP response was a “brutal nationwide crackdown”, and the military junta carried out mass killings and torture to such an extent that Hlaing is wanted by the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court for these crimes. Also, in the recent elections, voting lists only consisted of those living in military-ruled areas. This means that large swathes of people were unable to vote, obviously skewing results in Hlaing's favour. This, alongside the economic crisis brought by the war in Iran, has exacerbated civil unrest within the country – worsening the effects of the Civil War with a death toll of over 100,000 people and the displacement of 5.2 million.

Further, Hlaing's genocidal crimes against the Rohingya people threaten to worsen under his official presidency, regardless of the open genocide case against him in The Hague. This is made more stark considering that the Rohingya were completely excluded from voting earlier this year and that the military continues to enable their mass displacement and murder – a 'textbook example of ethnic cleansing.' Also, considering that China and Russia (increasingly prominent allies of Myanmar) seem consistent in their opposition to Hlaing being accused of such crimes, there is a very real fear that the issue may remain in a political deadlock.

Hlaing and the military's violence against the people have also led to regional tensions, evidenced by his exclusion from ASEAN’s most senior-level meetings. Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines (the current ASEAN chair) are insistent that it remains this way until Myanmar (and therefore the USDP) adhere to a five-point peace plan. However, Hlaing has argued that he cannot implement this peace plan because pro-military parliamentarians have rejected it repeatedly. In this way, it is hard to see how Hlaing’s ‘official’ presidency is going to allow him to shift global perception of Myanmar, if he cannot even negotiate his way back into ASEAN ranks.

However, this may not remain the case, as Hlaing seems to be keen on establishing bilateral relations with ASEAN countries to bypass the agreements set by the organisation. This is evidenced by the Myanmar-Thailand relationship, led by the approach of “calibrated engagement”, established because of the 2,400-kilometre land border they share. Hlaing's recent visit to Bangkok in August sparked protests outside of the Thai embassies in London, Seoul, and Tokyo, where they were pleading with the government not to ‘legitimise’ Hlaing’s rule in this way. Although the Thai foreign minister, Phuanketkow, has made clear that the diplomatic relationship is ‘not about legitimacy’, but about ‘reality.’

Despite his reassurance, it appears that Thailand really does seek to legitimise Hlaing’s autocratic rule for the sake of border security.

China is also keen on supporting Hlaing's regime, though this is more to gain economic power over Myanmar rather than for a mutual diplomatic relationship. Chinese involvement in the country is evidenced by the military and economic support that Beijing has given to the USDP. In fact, it was China that wanted elections to proceed so that there would be a more ‘predictable institutional setup’ in Myanmar, allowing for a more structured diplomatic relationship. This is to push through economic projects, such as the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. However, rather than empowering Hlaing's position, the relationship will keep him seemingly subservient to Beijing's 'tightening embrace’, as Myanmar becomes more reliant on China for a shift in global perception.

While China is keen to back the new administration in Myanmar, the US, Canada, the UK, and the EU maintain their economic sanctions on the country, suggesting there is little to no chance for Myanmar to be accepted onto the world stage by these countries. Marciel argues that this is because they ‘all see the recent elections as a sham’ and that Myanmar is not of particular diplomatic significance. Thus, while the Western world may not publicly accept Hlaing, they are perhaps more apathetic to him than anything, suggesting that his 'official' election as President of Myanmar will not provoke a global shift in perception.

By Tanya Roy

Image: Wikimedia Commons