The Death of Liberal Internationalism? Foreign Policy in Trump’s Second Term

By Che Wheeler

During the 2024 Presidential election, Trump was keen to expand upon his first-term reputation of being a seemingly great peacemaker: bold, utopian promises of ending the war in Ukraine in 24 hours and ensuring a peace settlement in the raging conflict in Gaza, while it seemed Biden and Harris remained blindly complacent with Israel’s actions. However, Trump’s ideas of peace are not as simple as getting people to sit down and talk to figure out a compromise, but what is certain, is that his new foreign policy might be the death knell to liberal internationalism as we know it.

Firstly, Ukraine and NATO. On paper, this may seem the most promising: Trump has clearly taken a realist approach when it comes to Russia, at least partially acknowledging that they feel threatened by the expansion of NATO’s influence, and thus accepting a level of territorial concessions for Moscow. Russia’s ambassador to the UN has already openly stated, however, that peace is not as simple as a day’s worth of business, and Russia’s endgame remains extracting as much as possible from Ukraine. If Trump goes forward with his plans to reduce aid to Ukraine while trying to advocate for a peace settlement, Russia will only take advantage of the former to conduct further offensives into Ukraine, in hopes of further legitimising its claims to the supposedly “annexed” territories. This is coupled with the fact that if Trump keeps his sceptic position towards NATO, a significant portion of the US security umbrella could be withdrawn from Europe in favour of other fronts. A new Trump Presidency is likely to force Europe into a difficult position: the weakening of American presence will only contribute to existing discord between the dysfunctional establishment in Western Europe, trying to impose a doomed sense of economic and political stability, and the rise of populist leaders seeking to fend for themselves rather than rely on weakening multinational institutions, wherever that is turning a blind eye to aggressive states like Russia, or looking after their own security needs first.

So, what about Gaza? One should not fall for Trump’s vague promises of peace here. Any notion of peace that Trump has previously committed to in the region has merely been to legitimise further Israel’s ambitions: recognition of Israel’s existence, rather than conflict resolution. A Harris Presidency would have at least seen some restraint regarding Israel’s actions, as her successor Biden warned over Israeli plans to invade Rafah and launch pre-emptive strikes into Iran. This is not the case for Trump, who is likely to give carte blanche to Israel in Gaza and beyond. Given that Trump has previously supported Israeli designs for annexing even more of the West Bank and moving its capital to Jerusalem, far-right members of the Israeli government, including key ministries such as defence, are likely to press for more radical actions in the Palestinian territories, up to the complete ignorance of the immense harm inflicted on civilians in Gaza, and the further eviction of Palestinians to make way for Jewish settlers. Now without the early 2000s pretence of human rights, there will be further calamities and violence in a region already scarred by conflict. This will be perpetuated by the fact that Trump is likely to resume his bullish stance against Iran. Consequently, the risk for an even wider, and more destructive, conflict in the region will rise; a worrying prospect given that Iran and Israel were close to such a scenario earlier this year.

Finally, the issues of China and trade. The former is an area where policy is the most bipartisan (the Biden administration has already toughened up to Beijing by restricting the trade of crucial technologies), yet Trump is likely to take it a step further. Prominent “China hawks” (those with aggressive rhetoric against China) in the US Senate are expected to form a crucial part of Trump’s government, including Michael Waltz and Marco Rubio. Trump is also looking to potentially raise tariffs on Chinese goods to as high as 60%. If such a motion were to pass, it would signal a concrete end to any notion of trying to court China into the global economy, heating up an already tense and developing trade war. Additionally, Trump is unlikely to slow down the ongoing military buildup between the two superpowers in the Asia-Pacific, fanning the flames for tense standoffs, with a narrow chance of war in Taiwan, especially given that Trump’s attitude to Ukraine may embolden Chinese resolve to test Washington themselves. Going back to proposed tariffs, they are also packaged with Trump’s proposal for a baseline 10% tariff on all imported goods, a move that clearly echoes the recent trends away from globalised trade and economic interdependence, and more towards self-serving protectionism. Such a move has even spooked America’s closest ally, Britain, with MPs pressing Starmer on whether he’ll push Trump to exclude the UK from the proposed tariffs.

To reflect, while Trump is not the first nor last actor to score decisive blows against liberal internationalism, he will certainly leave a more significant mark against it than the ones before. Trump’s semi-isolationist agenda, designed to court the American right, will leave the world’s most dangerous actors empowered to press forward their ambitions while fragmenting the democratic coalition into a state of high distrust and uncertainty.

Image: Wikimedia Commons