The New Cold War? The Arctic becomes the next geopolitical battleground
By: Dannia Iqbal

An accelerating rate of thawing permafrost has opened previously inaccessible trade barriers within the Arctic. The Russia-Ukraine war has pushed Russia’s Arctic economy towards China. Trump, since assuming office in 2025, has insisted on claiming Greenland. These factors point towards a security domain that mimics the Cold War; and yet, the lack of Sino-Russian bipolar bloc formation, lack of military action due to the nature of Arctic-based conflict, decentralized Arctic treaty network, and war as an unexpected outcome, leaves geopolitical tension in the Arctic undeserving of a Cold War label.
For Russia, China, and the US, respectively, the stakes are as follows: Russia wants to raise the price of entry for foreign military assets in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF) and to control the Northern Sea Route (NSR).
The ‘Bastion’ concept captures Russia’s military posture concisely: expanding control outside of the AZRF around the Kola Peninsula to protect second-strike nuclear forces. The Russia-Ukraine war has rendered Russia weaker in the Arctic, an area where Moscow previously held strategic dominance.
China, as a ‘near-Arctic state’, aims to understand, protect, develop and participate in the governance of the Arctic. Xi Jinping launched the Silk Road Initiative in 2013, to cut trade routes though Southeast Asia, South Asia, East Africa, and the Mediterranean.
The US is after defense and territory expansion: Alaska is a site for missile defence, and Greenland is a forward platform for missile warning and space surveillance for the US and NATO. Greenland is also a deposit for critical minerals that could prove useful for military systems. Their interests in the Arctic are restricted to playing catch-up, in the face of Sino-Russian strengthening interests. However, Sino-Russian interests do not exactly overlap: ‘Moscow prioritizes control, Beijing wants access’.
The argument for an ‘Arctic Cold War’ can be made in terms of security.
To understand this, the Kola Peninsula is important: it abuts Norway and Finland and hosts two-thirds of the second-strike, sea-based nuclear deterrent. The Russian Northern Fleet is vital for its security and is based here; the Kola holds nuclear warheads, nuclear submarines, and nuclear missiles. In the context of the war deteriorating conventional capabilities, and the impact of climate change in the AZRF, Russian deterrence strategies are partly contingent on Arctic-based deterrence.
To truly consider the geopolitical Arctic struggle as a mimicry of the Cold War, bloc formation is a necessary component.
Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Finland and Sweden applied for NATO membership; 2 arctic states that could grant the US Army full access to 17 Swedish bases and 15 Finnish bases. Finland was accepted as a NATO member in 2023, and if Sweden follows suit, this could insulate US defence along the cold Arctic further.
In September, the US, Denmark, and Greenland signed a trilateral security agreement designed to prevent US and NATO rivals from gaining a foothold in Greenland. It prohibits any non-NATO country (specifically naming China and Russia) from building military bases or deploying troops on Greenland's territory.
Although Russia and China do not overlap in terms of Arctic interests, Russia is leveraging China as a ‘force multiplier’ near Alaska and the Aleutian Islands to destabilize regional security and create a broader impact on US and NATO interests. NATO has referred to China as a ‘decisive enabler’ of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Since Ukraine has built their drone technology, they have a waning reliance on China for this purpose. To reduce Ukraine’s dependence on China for drone components, Ukraine has collaborated with Taiwan despite their ‘relatively nascent’ drone industry. Due to Beijing’s ‘close partnership with Russia’, Ukraine has a greater incentive to carefully wean off Chinese drone dependency since, as their ‘largest trading partner’, China ‘could do serious economic damage’.
What complicates this further is that, Ukrainian drone strike campaign against Russia’s Arctic energy hub could bind Moscow in a difficult position, by undercutting the Kremlin’s efforts to control the NSR.
Russia has deployed an aggressive military posture around the Arctic. In February 2026, Moscow announced live artillery shootings a few miles from Norwegian territorial waters. Air patrols extend beyond the Barnets sea and reach the Greenland Sea, the Central Arctic Ocean, and the North Pacific: this is active signaling against Western presence.
There is, undoubtedly, a ‘new normal’ being established with increasing uncontested military access in the Arctic, reinforcing a tit-for-tat security dilemma between Russia and NATO
What constricts action and response in the Arctic Council, however, is that there is no incident-prevention mechanism, and miscalculation can be seen as a gateway for escalation. Since ceasing cooperation with Russia in 2022, international treaties under the council to manage maritime traffic, environmental risks, and research needs under a rapidly warming arctic, have all been prevented from being practically implemented. There is a vacuum and a blockage of the Council, unnervingly reminiscent of a Cold War pulse.
However, it is important to err on the side of caution when regarding the Sino-Russian allegiance: overlapping interests do not render underlying tensions null, and do not necessarily apply in the Arctic due to lack of military cooperation. Their ‘pragmatic partnership’ carries bitter undertones when considering how, ‘Russia continued to act as a gatekeeper to China’s ability to operate in the Arctic’.
China has also maintained economic and trade interactions with Canada and Norway, placing questionable restraints on their ‘no limits’ relationship.
Clearly, there is a Cold War mindset. However, what is important to distinguish is that each power has a priority in personally vested interests that precedes alliances, making actual conflict unlikely and collaboration possible.
Image: Flickr

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